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In this paper, following the claims made by various mathematicians,
I try to construct a theory of levels of abstraction. I first try to clarify
the basic components of the abstract method as it developed in the first
quarter of the 20th century. I then submit an explication of the notion of
levels of abstraction. In the final section, I briefly explore some of main
philosophical consequences of the theory.
1 Introduction
One of the distinctive features of 20th century mathematics is the rise and sys-
tematic use of the abstract method. The latter changed dramatically both the
very object of mathematics and its methods. Mathematics suddenly referred
to groups, rings, fields, metric spaces, topological spaces, vector spaces, Banach
spaces, manifolds, lattices, categories, etc. and it relied on the abstract method
for its presentation and development. The abstract method is at the core of
what came to be known as ‘modern mathematics’. As a by-product, the ab-
stract method opened the door to the idea that there are levels of abstraction
in mathematics: there are parts of mathematics that are more abstract than
others. Mathematicians themselves speak that way spontaneously. Here are
three representative passages found in textbooks:
However, as we began to think about the task at hand, ..., we decided
to organize the material in a manner quite different from that of our




This text attempts a different approach, letting the abstract con-
cepts emerge gradually from less abstract problems about geometry,
polynomials, numbers, etc. This is how the subject evolved histori-
cally. This is how all good mathematics evolves — abstraction and
generalization is forced upon us as we attempt to understand the
“concrete” and the particular. [26, p. 3]
This book is intended as an introduction to that part of mathe-
matics that today goes by the name of abstract algebra. The term
“abstract” is a highly subjective one; what is abstract to one person
is very often concrete and down-to-earth to another, and vice versa.
In relation to the current research activity in algebra, it could be
described as “not too abstract”; from the point of view of someone
schooled in the calculus and who is seeing the present material for
the first time, it may very well be described as “quite abstract”.
([11, pp. 1 - 2]
The quotes state without any further explanation that there are levels of ab-
straction. The second quote goes somewhat further and asserts that the levels
of abstraction arose historically and that abstraction was ‘forced’ upon math-
ematicians. It seems that for these quoted mathematicians, the proposal that
there are ideas, theories, concepts that are more abstract than others is obvious
and does not need any further clarification or discussion. It is as if the claim is
based on a common, clear and widespread mathematical experience.
The last quote has a different flavor. The author suggests that “being ab-
stract” is a subjective term. As I hope to show in this paper, I think that this
claim is plain wrong. I submit that the author is confusing familiarity with a
subject with its abstract character.
My goal in this paper is to clarify what mathematicians might mean by levels
of abstraction. I believe that the claim can be taken literally and that it is not
a subjective matter. It is, as I will argue, a consequence of the abstract method
itself. The paper will therefore proceed as follows. In the next section, I will
provide an overview of what I take to be the main components and properties of
the abstract method in mathematics. I will then propose a definition of levels of
abstraction based on some of the elements of that method. Finally, in the last
section, I will explore some of the philosophical consequences of this approach1.
2 The abstract method: basic components
I have elsewhere presented some of the historical roots and components of the
abstract method in mathematics. (See [20].) It is nonetheless necessary to
recapitulate and develop from a different perspective the conceptual ingredients
of my analysis.
1I urge readers to consult the paper by Hourya Benis Sinaceur for a slightly different point
of view on the matter. See [2].
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Informally, the abstract method can be described as follows. It is made
up of three different components2. The first component is the identification
of invariant properties in theories which seem to be essentially incompatible at
first sight; 2. The second component is the systematic ignorance of some of the
specific properties of the objects of each theory (this is the step that justifies the
name “abstraction” since one has to “subtract” key properties of the objects
of the given theories) and the presentation in an appropriate language of the
invariant properties; 3. The last component is the identification of a criterion
of identity on the basis of the properties chosen and, thus, the introduction of a
new type of entities, the abstract entities, and the exploration of the properties
of these new entities.
Let me reformulate these components, using a somewhat more formal set-up.
The abstract method comprises three basic parts that are related systematically
and thus make a whole. The first part is what I call a domain of significant
variation. It is made up of at least three essentially different theories, denoted
by T1,T2,T3. The second part is a method of presentation together with a
method of development, which was historically identified with the axiomatic
method and which yields a new theory, denoted by TAbs. The third part is a
new criterion of identity for the emerging entities, X 'TAbs Y .
The links between the parts are as follows. Between the domain of significant
variation and the method of presentation and development, we have what I will
call the formalist stance and it consists in identifying the invariant properties
within the domain of variation and forgetting what the symbols used actually
refer to. Between the method of presentation and the criterion of identity, we
have the extraction of a new criterion of identity together with the understand-
ing of how it applies, that is using the new criterion in a way that the following
form of Leibniz’s principle applies:
If P (X) and X ∼=TAbs Y, then P (Y ).







// X 'TAbs Y
T3
??
One simple historical example might be useful before I explain the diagram
2The temporal order of these components can vary. Indeed, historically one finds various
combinations, although most cases seem to follow the order of our presentation, for reasons
that are not very hard to understand. It is, however, interesting to note that there are cases
where the development follows a different path.
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and thus the method in more details. One of the very first cases of an extraordi-
narily successful abstraction in the history of modern mathematics is certainly
that of metric spaces, introduced by Fréchet around 1906 in the context of func-
tional analysis3. At the turn of the century, mathematicians thought of man-
ifolds as subspaces of spaces of real or complex points. Fréchet, for instance,
was dealing with the usual manifolds, namely R,R2, . . . ,Rn, . . . ,C,C2, . . . ,Cn
together with functions between them on the one hand, and infinite-dimensional
functional spaces together with operators between them on the other hand. In
his thesis, Fréchet gives the following four examples of functional spaces. (See
[8] or [27].)
1. Let J be a closed interval of the real line R and consider the space RJ of
continuous functions f : J → R. A metric on RJ is defined by
d(f, g) = max(|f(x)− g(x)|) ∀x ∈ J.
2. Consider the space E∞ = RN of infinite sequences x = (x1, x2, . . . ) of real







1 + |xn − yn|
.
3. A space of parametrized curves in R3 with the standard Euclidean metric
between points. Using the latter, Fréchet defines a metric between the
curves.
4. Finally, let A be a complex plane region whose boundary consists of one
or more contours. Let {An} be a sequence of bounded regions such that
An ⊂ int(An+1) and An ⊂ int(A) and such that any given bounded region
in the interior of A is in the interior of some An for n sufficiently large.
Consider the space {f : int(A)→ C|f is holomorphic} and let
Mn(f, g) = max(|f(z)− g(z)|) when z is in the closure of An.









Although I haven’t described the third example in details, I hope that it is
nonetheless clear that these examples are radically different from one another
and, perhaps even more so, from the spaces of points Rn and Cn. I submit that
if we did not know about the metric involved in each case, we might not see
the invariant features involved. Indeed, we are accustomed to attribute certain
3It is known that Fréchet knew about the case of groups and that it provided at least
guidelines and a model of what could be achieved by moving up the ladder of abstraction.
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properties to real functions: continuity, differentiability, roots, maximum, mini-
mum, etc., we represent the graph of a function as a one-dimensional path in the
codomain, thus as something that necessarily has a length, we think of a real
function as a systematic relation of dependence between two or more proper-
ties, as a quantity that varies according to a certain pattern or whose variation
depends on a another variation. A function is essentially thought of as being
dynamic. The four examples given by Fréchet are of this kind. A (real) point is,
well, a point. It has none of the properties of a function. Thus, the properties
of the elements of R and even Rn are incommensurable with the properties of
the elements of a functional space. I want to insist on the fact that given the
properties of functions and given that we think of functions with their proper-
ties, it is hard to conceive of a space of functions, that is treating the latter as
being points. It is as if we were trying to think of the properties of functions and
forget about them at the same time. Of course, as soon as we have succeeded
in thinking of them as spaces, we stumble upon what is certainly seen as being
the main difference between these spaces and the usual spaces of points: the
examples given above are infinite dimensional. Thus, we also have two different
types: finite dimensional spaces on one side and infinite dimensional spaces on
the other.
I want to emphasize the fact that in order to see the invariant features
between the different theories, one has to forget or ignore essential aspects of
the objects and their properties involved. One has to ignore key properties of
functions, of series, of the complex numbers, etc. One of the ways to succeed this
operation is to concentrate on the formalism, the symbols and the operations
on these symbols. This posture is what I call the formalist stance. Historically,
it is easy to find mathematicians emphasizing the necessity of this stance. Here
is one clear illustration:
In the following an attempt is made to present Galois theory of
algebraic equations in a way which include equally well all cases in
which this theory might by used. Thus we present it here as a direct
consequence of the group concept illuminated by the field concept,
as a formal structure completely without reference to any numerical
interpretation of the elements used. (Weber, 1893, p. 521 quoted by
[4, p. 36])[my emphasis]
Weber says clearly that in this case, one has to forget what the symbols stand
for and concentrate on the formal structure, on the relations and operations
that exist between the objects. The same posture applies to the case of metric
spaces: one has to forget the idiosyncrasies of the elements of the various spaces,
what the symbols refer to and focus on the invariant structural features that
these domains share. Notice that if one does not move to the next step, namely
the extraction of an appropriate criterion of identity for new objects, then the
only coherent philosophical position left is a variant of formalism.
Thus, the next step consists in finding the proper language and the right
properties to present the invariant features involved in the domain of signifi-
cant variation. Historically, the axiomatic method seemed to be perfect for the
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purpose. So much so that mathematicians very often identify the axiomatic
method with the abstract method. I will come back to this point later.
Once the invariant properties have been identified, it is only natural to inves-
tigate the logical consequences of these properties and verify that it is possible
to develop relevant and useful mathematics from them. Then and only then a
criterion of identity for the new, abstract entities can be extracted. In other
words, the criterion of identity can not be given a priori but is derived from the
theory4.
Let us now look at these components and their relations one by one.
2.1 Domain of significant variation
Thus, owing to its abstract foundation, modern algebra winds a
unifying band of method around essentially different things and in
this way contributes to the required organic and systemic unification
of mathematics. [10, pp. 18-19][my emphasis]
In the foregoing diagram, I have put three, essentially different theories. I
claim that these two elements, that is the number of theories and the fact that
they differ in an essential manner, are necessary and sufficient for the abstract
method to be used in a particular case.
The number three is not accidental. It seems to play a key role in the method
itself. I have to emphasize that I present this claim as an empirical hypothesis.
Although with hindsight, there are good reasons to believe that the number of
theories is indeed necessary, it came to me a posteriori, by examining the his-
torical record. Let me start with a long quote from an historian of mathematics
who happened to come to the same conclusion for a specific important case.
It is obviously true that the concept of a permutation group derived
from the development of the theory of algebraic equations and from
Galois theory. But this development, associated with the names of
A. Vandermonde, J.-L. Lagrange, P. Ruffini, N.H. Abel, E. Galois,
J.-A. Serret and C. Jordan, is just one of the historical roots of
group theory. The mathematical literature of the nineteenth cen-
tury, and especially the work of decisive importance for the evo-
lution of the abstract group concept written at the century’s end,
make it abundantly clear that that development had three equally
important historical roots, namely, the theory of algebraic equations,
number theory, and geometry. Abstract group theory was the result
4I have to come back to my earlier remark concerning the temporal order involved here. It
is tempting to read the diagram from left to right and to think that there is a chronological
order in that reading. Although it is in most cases correct, there are counterexamples to that
reading, e.g. Boolean algebras or lattices. What seems to be correct is the step from the
presentation of the theory to the extraction of the criterion of identity. As far as I know, that
step is always taken in that order, although once the method has been well-understood, the
delay between the presentation of the theory and the extraction of the criterion of identity
can be very short.
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of a gradual process of abstraction from implicit and explicit group-
theoretic methods and concepts involving the interaction of its three
historical roots. I stress that my inclusion of number theory and ge-
ometry among the sources of causal tendencies for the development
of abstract group theory is grounded in the historical record and is
not the result of a backward projection of modern group theoretic
thought. ([30, p. 16])
This is but one case. What is striking is that when one looks at the development
of ring theory and field theory, one finds a similar situation. (See, for the case
of ring theory, [14, 5] and, for the case of field theory, [15].) As we have seen,
Fréchet took the time to present four different function spaces, as well as the
usual manifolds. What is even more striking is that the abstract method, con-
ceived as genuine method in algebra, arose only after there were three different
cases where the method turned out to be fruitful: groups, rings and fields.
We can also find theoretical reasons that makes the claim a priori plausible.
Indeed, when there are two theories, it seems reasonable to think that one will
either consider a simple generalization or an analogy between them. When there
are at least three essentially different theories, then the essential differences make
it difficult to believe that a simple generalization is possible and the fact that
there are at least three brings us immediately outside the realm of analogies.
The idea of a significant variation can be expressed more formally as follows.
Each theory Ti has its own criterion of identity a 'Ti b. Therefore, we are
dealing with (at least) three distinct criteria of identity satisfying Leibniz’s
principle:
1. In T1, if P (a) and a 'T1 b, then P (b).
2. In T2, if Q(f) and f 'T2 g, then Q(g).
3. In T3, if R(α) and α 'T3 β, then R(β).
These are incompatible in the sense that one would not, for instance, necessarily
attribute certain properties, say P1, ..., Pn to the objects αi of T3 and conversely,
one would not apply the properties R1, ..., Rk to the objects ai of T1. In fact, in
some cases, even if one would try to apply, let us say Pi to αj , one would in some
cases consider ¬Pi instead. Thus, in order to abstract properly, it is necessary
to be able to ignore, forget or subtract some of the properties of the objects
in the given theories. Furthermore, the properties that have to be subtracted
are not necessarily the same in each case. I submit that this is a real cognitive
stumbling block to abstraction in mathematics. A clear empirical hypothesis
could be formulated and be tested on students learning vector spaces, group
theory, topology or any other similar theory.
In other words, the epistemic attention has to shift from certain pregnant
features of the objects under study to the invariant elements involved across the
various theories. The latter are usually operations or relations between these
objects. Again, I want to emphasize that at this stage, one could stop and
either work in a purely formal fashion or consider that one is doing algebra
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in the classical sense of that word, that is working on generalized arithmetic
operations. As we have indicated elsewhere (see [20]), it is easy to find this
attitude in the 19th century, especially when one looks at the development of
algebra during that period. The situation changes radically once it is clear
that it is possible to consider a new type of entities supporting these properties
and relations. Once the invariant features have been identified, recognized as
such and as being the same in all cases, then a criterion of identity can be
formulated. The invariant component is from then on circumscribed clearly and
independently of the original entities. These are seen to be instances of these
new types and are studied as such, that is, there is a shift of attention from the
old criterion of identity and its associated properties to the new criterion and
its associated properties.
Very often, it is then possible to discover and construct new, unforeseen
instances of these new abstract entities. Thus, the domain of variation can
expand and is never fixed once and for all. In more philosophical terms, once
the new types have been fixed, known examples become tokens of the type and
new, unforeseen tokens can be constructed or discovered.
2.2 The axiomatic method and the abstract method
From an historical perspective, the abstract character of contemporary mathe-
matics can be attributed, at least in part, to the axiomatic method. However,
many mathematicians identify the abstract method with the axiomatic method.
To wit:
The abstract or postulational development of these systems must
then be supplemented by an investigation of their “structure.” ([17,
p. 18], quoted also by [4, p. 258]) [My emphasis]
Mac Lane’s formulation is typical of the period: the abstract and the axiomatic
seem to be interchangeable. This attitude still prevails today:
It is abstraction — more than anything else — that characterizes
the mathematics of the twentieth century. There is both power and
elegance in the axiomatic method, attributes that can and should be
appreciated by students early in their mathematical careers and even
if they happen to be confronting contemporary abstract mathematics
in a serious way for the very first time. ([29, p. ix])
Again, the author writes as if the axiomatic method and the abstract method
were the same thing. The axiomatic method is but one method of presentation
and development of the invariant content of theories in the domain of variation.
The axiomatic method played a key role in the construction of the abstract
method, but the latter is not the same thing as the axiomatic method.
It is extremely easy to convince oneself that the axiomatic method has noth-
ing to do, by itself, with the abstract. Indeed, one can use the axiomatic method
to present a theory about a unique set of entities, as it was probably conceived to
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present Euclidean geometry. One can even use the axiomatic method to present
a physical theory, e.g. a theory about the concrete world. Thus, as such, it is
hard to see how one can identify the abstract with the axiomatic.
The fact is, that axiomatic method has a long history and therefore acquired
various, even incompatible, roles in mathematics and in foundational studies.
Let us briefly recapitulate some of the functions of the axiomatic method.
Let us start with Hilbert:
..., Hilbert’s own use of the axiomatic method involved, by definition,
an acknowledgment of the conceptual priority of the concrete entities
of classical mathematics, and a desire to improve our understanding
of them, rather than a drive to encourage the study of mathematical
entities defined by abstract axioms devoid of immediate, intuitive
significance. ... All the concepts introduced in algebra derive their
meaning, their justification and their properties from those of the
systems of complex and real numbers, rather than the other way
around. ([4, p. 170])
Here the axiomatic method is clearly separated from “abstract axioms”. Corry
claims that, for Hilbert, the axiomatic method had little to do with the abstract
method and, what it had, it had only in a derivative manner. The key element,
for Hilbert, is the desire to improve our understanding of concrete entities of
classical mathematics and the axiomatic method becomes a tool for that very
purpose.
For him [Hilbert], the real focus of interest lay in the interrelation
among the various groups of axioms, rather than among the indi-
vidual axioms across groups. For him, the groups corresponded to
the isolable basis of our spatial intuition and the main task of his
axiomatic approach was to show the way in which they logically
interacted to create the body of geometric knowledge. ([6, p. 5])
Often, when a domain of inquiry is axiomatized, the goal is to lay bare the
underlying logical structure of the system of definitions and proofs, because the
field has become a complete conceptual mess. Clarity and order are brought by
a clean and lean axiomatic development. The structure of logical dependence
between 1) primitive notions and the defined ones are exhibited and 2) the
axioms and the deduced propositions is displayed openly. Thus, a structure of
justification between the notions as well as between the propositions and based
solely on logical relationships becomes transparent. As such, the axioms can be
presented as constituting the foundations of the given domain. Hilbert’s work
in the foundations of geometry belongs to that category.
Some philosophers and mathematicians attribute an additional epistemic
function to axioms in this context: the axioms should provide basic, self-evident
truths upon which the whole given domain rests. Frege, for one, certainly
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believed that axioms had to have this epistemic feature5. This desiderata is
clearly not an ingredient of the abstract method. It is hard to convince oneself
that the axioms of group theory, for instance, are self-evident.
After Hilbert and using some of Hilbert’s tools, logicians and mathematicians
turned their attention to axioms themselves. This became known as postula-
tional analysis and was energetically developed in the USA by E.H. Moore and
his students.
But in the case of E.H. Moore, his students at Chicago, and some
other contemporary USA mathematicians, their study of the Grund-
lagen led to development of a point of view that diverged from
Hilbert’s in this significant yet subtle matter: they turned the anal-
ysis of systems of axioms into a field of intrinsic mathematical in-
terest in which the requirements introduced by Hilbert oriented the
research questions and afforded the main technical tools to deal with
them. ([6, p. 5])
The function of the axiomatic method is now different. One wants to reduce the
number of axioms, investigate their independence, the categoricity of the system,
their (syntactic) coherence and, later the semantic coherence, completeness, etc.
Clearly, the abstract method has, in itself, nothing to do with this usage of
axioms.
Of course, axioms and the axiomatic method did play a key role in the rise of
the abstract method. The axioms capture the invariant features of the theories
under investigation. Once these have been identified, the axiomatic method
allows for the systematic and rigorous development of the consequences of these
features. One could use a different method of presentation of the invariant
features. It depends on the linguistic means available. For instance, nowadays,
it would be possible to use a graphical language to present a new theory by
using what are called sketches. (See [1] for an introduction to the language
of sketches as a method of presentation of theories.) Be that as it may, I
think that the identification of the axiomatic method with the abstract method
5Needless to say, this epistemic standpoint was not and is certainly not adopted by all
mathematicians and logicians using the axiomatic method this way. In fact, the whole spec-
trum of positions is likely to be found within the community of mathematicians and logicians.
Contrast, for instance, the following claim made by Hölder
[the axioms of arithmetic] which are based on the fact that we take it as evident
that there are certain processes, which, as we say, proceed according to determi-
nate rules that are always performable in a definite way and in certain cases can
be carried out repeatedly without end. (Hölder, quoted by Scanlan [24, 988].)
where Hölder mentions that we take certain things or processes as being evident, with the
following claim made by his contemporary Peano
Logical questions thus become completely independent of empirical or psycho-
logical , questions (and, in particular, or the problem of knowledge) and every
question concerning the simplicity of ideas and the obviousness of facts disap-
pears. (Peano, quoted by Scanlan [24, 988].)
The distance between these two positions could hardly be greater.
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introduces some confusion. Indeed, some mathematicians started to attribute
to the axiomatic method virtues that belong to the abstract method. I will get
back to this important point in the section on philosophical consequences.
2.3 Extracting a criterion of identity
I claim that the extraction of a criterion of identity has been the blind spot
in the mathematicians’ journey through the abstract method. Contemporary
mathematicians nowadays suppose that the proper criterion of identity comes
almost automatically with the right axiomatic theory. For, this is how we are
taught modern mathematics: one learns the axioms, some of their most impor-
tant consequences and immediately after, the proper notion of homomorphism
for the structure given and the resulting notion of isomorphism for that struc-
ture. We now take for granted the last notion and its importance. Historically,
there is a time lag between the identification of a certain mathematical struc-
ture and its proper criterion of identity. This is not surprising as such. What
is somewhat surprising is the length of the delay between the identification of
the properties and the proper criterion of identity. Two historical cases can be
mentioned: the case of homeomorphism for topological spaces and the case of
equivalence for categories.
Topology slowly emerged as a field at the beginning of the 20th century and
the theory was axiomatized for the first time by Hausdorff in 19146. However,
the definition of homeomorphism is nowhere to be found in the original edition
of the book, although the concept is clearly there, probably under the influence
of Fréchet’s work in which it is clearly identified. It is, however, identified as
such by Hausdorff in his 1927 edition. The clear conception of the notion of
homeomorphism and its importance for topology was written clearly and un-
ambiguously by Kuratowski in 1921, thus almost ten years after Hausdorff’s
axiomatization. If one consider the roots of topology and looks at analysis si-
tus, then one finds that it took far more than a decade to set the record straight,
in fact, almost fifty years. According to G. H. Moore, “at different times and
by different authors, at least four distinct concepts were identified in Euclidean
spaces with those mappings under which topological properties were invariant.”
([22, p. 333]) These four concepts are: the concept of injective continuous
mapping, that of homeomorphism, the notion of deformation and, finally, the
concept of diffeomorphism. What will certainly surprise a contemporary math-
ematician is that “it took decades for mathematicians to learn to distinguish
clearly between them.” [22, p. 334] These four different concepts were clearly
seen as being different by the community at large in the 1930s only.
Another significant example is provided by category theory. (See [16] and
[18] for more on the history of category theory.) In Eilenberg and Mac Lane’s
original paper published in 1945 ([7]), one does find the notion of isomorphism
6The axiomatization of topology went through various phases from 1914 until the late
1950’s. This is an interesting case where the different axiomatic frameworks are proposed
mainly for practical reasons, that is, the modifications suited the specific needs of various
mathematicians at different times.
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of categories and it was certainly assumed by Eilenberg and Mac Lane that the
latter was the proper criterion of identity for categories. However, for reasons
that would take us too far from our present concern, the notion of isomorphism of
categories turned out to be inappropriate as a criterion of identity in the practice
of category theory, in particular when one considers functor categories, e.g.
categories of sheaves in the context of algebraic geometry. I hasten to add that
although Eilenberg and Mac Lane considered functor categories in their original
article, the latter played a purely auxiliary role in the original paper. This
fact changed completely when the theory came in the brains of Grothendieck
and Kan in the mid 1950s. Indeed, functor categories moved to the center
stage from that moment on. Be that as it may, the proper criterion of identity
for categories, namely the notion of equivalence of categories, was introduced
explicitly as such by Grothendieck in his famous Tohoku paper published in
1957 ([9]), twelve years after Eilenberg and Mac Lane’s original paper.
Our main point is simple: it is not until the proper criterion of identity has
been identified and applied systematically that the theory acquires an autonomy,
both epistemological and ontological. Notice also that it is the presence of a
new criterion of identity that allows to say that we are indeed in the presence
of a new type of abstraction, for as we have seen, the usage of the axiomatic
method in itself does not entail the need of a new criterion of identity. In the
case of a given classical domain with an given criterion of identity, the role of
the axiomatic method is radically different than the one it plays in the context
of the abstract method. The identification of the proper criterion of identity is
of fundamental importance, since it allows to sift the properties of the resulting
theory from the properties of the previous theories. In other words, it captures
the process of abstraction itself.
I claim that we now have all the pieces laying in front of us. I have presented
the bare bones of the abstract method that characterized modern mathematics.
We are now ready to see how the abstract method leads to levels of abstraction.
3 The abstract method and levels of abstraction
Let us first examine the very idea of levels of abstraction in mathematics and
start with a few paradigmatic cases.
I claim that the notion of topological space is more abstract than the concept
of metric space. Informally, the idea is that there is more significant variation
among topological spaces that there is among metric spaces. This informal claim
rests in part on a series of precise mathematical results that are well-known.
First, every metric space give rises to a topological space in a canonical way.
Second, every map between metric spaces, i.e. every continuous map that do
not increase any pairwise distance7 is trivially a continuous map between the
associated topological spaces. In other words, there is a canonical functor from
the category of metric spaces to the category of topological spaces. However,
7The definition of maps between metric spaces is always a delicate matter. We have chosen
a simple class of morphisms. The main point remains, no matter how we choose them.
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it is also a well-known result that not all topological spaces are metrizable.
Only topological spaces satisfying certain properties are metrizable. Finally,
two different metric spaces can give rise to the same topological space.
Are these facts enough to conclude that the concept of topological space is
more abstract than the concept of metric space? Notice that both categories are
“just as big”, that is, it seems hopeless to exploit some cardinality condition in
general. Being less abstract cannot merely be captured, for instance, by the fact
that the extension of the concept D, e.g. being a metric space, is strictly included
in the concept C, e.g. being a topological space. The structures involved, their
properties and how they are related have to be used to make sense of the notion
of levels of abstraction. Notice also that it seems inappropriate to simply say
that the notion of topological space is more general than the notion of metric
space. It is indeed, but from an epistemological point of view, to focus on
generality is to miss the point of the conceptual difference between the two
notions.
Let us go up the stairs of abstraction. I claim that the notion of locale is
more abstract than the notion of topological space. (See [13, 23] for more on the
theory of locales.) The reasons are essentially the same as those of the foregoing
example. To see this, let us briefly recall the definition of a locale and certain
basic facts about them.
We first have to start with the algebraic notion of frame. A frame is a par-
tially ordered set with finite meets and arbitrary joins such that meets distribute
over joins. A morphism of frames is a map of sets that preserves finite meets
and arbitrary joins. Notice that a frame is automatically a Heyting algebra,
but that frame homomorphisms need not preserve the Heyting implication. In
fact, frames are sometimes identified with complete Heyting algebras. We can
therefore consider the category of frames and frame homomorphisms. The cat-
egory of locales is the opposite of the category of frames, that is it has the same
objects but the morphisms go in the opposite direction.
To understand the link between locales and topological spaces, one has to
consider the algebra of open sets of a topological space. It is easy to see that it
is a frame. Thus, every topological space gives rise in a canonical way to a locale
and every continuous map gives rise to a map of locales. However, the notion
of locale, although closely related to the notion of topological space, yields a
different mathematical theory of space. The crucial difference is that, in a very
specific sense, the theory of locales is the theory of pointless topology. Whereas
a topological space always has an underlying set of points, the basic notion in
locale theory is the notion of open subspace, the notion of point being a special
case of the latter. For instance, there are non-empty locales that are without
points8. The key is of course the notion of point. In a category C, a point of
an object X of C is given by a morphism from the terminal object 1, assuming
the latter exists, into X. In the category Set of sets and functions, there is a
bijection between the elements of a set X and its points in this sense, for the
8Thus, it seems rather obvious that the notion of locale could be useful for mereology. As
far as I know, no one has looked at the links between traditional mereological notions and the
theory of locales.
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terminal object of the category of sets is any singleton set. In the category
Top, a point of a space X is a continuous morphism from the one point space 1
into X. The locale corresponding to the one point space 1 is of course the two
element poset, in fact Boolean algebra 2 and, therefore, a point of a locale O(X)
is a morphism 2→ O(X). Given that the category of locales is the opposite of
the category of frames, points of locales correspond to frame homomorphisms
O(X) → 2. As is well-known, there are non-atomic Boolean algebras, thus
pointless locales.
As in the previous case, there are different (non-sober) topological spaces,
that is non homeomorphic spaces that give rise to isomorphic locales9. Again,
since there are pointless locales, the notion of locale is indeed also more general
than the notion of topological space and not all locales are spatial10. I claim
that in this case also, it would be insufficient to merely focus on the differ-
ence in generality between the concepts. There is something else, something
epistemologically more important at work.
Here is an example of two notions that I believe are at the same level of
abstraction: the notion of group and the notion of abelian group. I claim that
they are just as abstract and that the property that separates them does not
introduce a difference in their level of abstraction.
It would be easy to multiply the examples and explore various cases. (I
encourage the reader to do so!) But our goal here is more modest. We only
presented these examples to convince the reader that it seems plausible to say
that a given mathematical notion is more abstract than another and I hope that
these examples are plausible.
Let us sum up. We are now in the following position. First, there is circum-
stantial empirical evidence that mathematicians accept the idea that there are
levels of abstraction in mathematics. Second, the abstract method, as it was
developed in the 20th century, clearly opens the door to a procedure that can
yield different levels of abstraction, provided that the latter notion makes sense
at all. Third, there are cases of mathematical notions about which it seems rea-
sonable to say that they differ in their levels of abstraction. It is another matter
to say exactly what differing in levels of abstraction might mean. Assuming
that we have sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a need for some sort
of philosophical clarification of the notion of levels of abstraction, I present the
following proposal.
Let T1 and T2 be two mathematical theories such that there is a canonical
way to transform every model of T2 into a model of T1. Given a model M of
T2, we denote the canonical model of T1 it gives rise to by F(M). We say that
T1 is more abstract than a theory T2 if
1. (∀M1)(∀M2)(M1 ∼=T2 M2 ⇒ F (M1) ∼=T1 F (M2))
2. (∃M1)(∃M2)(F (M2) ∼=T1 F (M1) ∧M1 T2 M2).
9This is not an entirely trivial result. It requires some fiddling around. One way to go to
build the appropriate spaces can be found in [3].
10Informally, a locale is spatial if it arises from the lattice of open sets of a topological space.
It is of course possible to give an intrinsic characterization.
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3. The objects F (M2) and F (M1) are non trivial.
The first clause simply says that the theories are connected in a systematic fash-
ion, i.e. the criteria of identity of T2 is preserved by the canonical transforma-
tion F . Notice that any functor between two categories of models automatically
preserves isomorphisms. Hence, we have a specific framework in which this con-
dition is easily satisfied. More importantly, the functor F has to be canonical.
This is obviously a tricky expression and although it is used by mathematicians
in numerous circumstances and occasions, it does not have a precise technical
meaning. Nor will we try to give one to it11. The second condition captures
the idea that we are dealing with an abstraction process. As we have indicated
in section 2.3, a criteria of identity allows one to determine the relevant prop-
erties of given objects. Thus, the condition stipulates that there is at least one
property that allows one to distinguish between M1 and M2 but that when one
moves to the canonical objects F (M1) and F (M2) arising from M1 and M2
respectively, it is no longer possible to distinguish them. In other words, the
discriminating properties were abstracted from M1 and M2. The third condi-
tion is simply there to block trivial cases where one would erroneously conclude
that there is a new level of abstraction when, in fact, one has in some sense
abstracted everything.
We can now assert that topology is more abstract than the theory of metric
spaces and that the theory of locales is more abstract than topology. Our
informal exposition above contains all the required ingredients to verify that
the formal characterizations applies. I will leave to the reader the pleasure of
exploring other cases and come to its conclusions.
4 Some philosophical consequences
This section will be sketchy and brief. I will barely touch upon some of the
consequences of the foregoing proposal here.
4.1 Epistemological consequences of the abstract method
The axiomatic method is thus first a method of economy of thought,
in that it allows to condense many different reasonings in one. (...)
But the axiomatic method is also a method of discovery and of
progress12. (Weil, pp. 19-20) [My translation]
11In practice, mathematicians know what it means to say that something is given canonically
or that there is canonical construction or presentation of something. Very roughly, it means
that the construction does not depend on a choice from a mathematician in the process.
Whether this can be made more precise is an open question. See, however, [19] on the
subject.
12“La méthode axiomatique est donc d’abord méthode d’économie de pensée, en ceci qu’elle
permet de condenser en un seul plusieurs raisonnements différents. (...) Mais la méthode
axiomatique est aussi méthode de découverte et de progrès.”
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I believe this is another revealing case of a mathematician confusing the ax-
iomatic method with the abstract method. I submit that it is really the abstract
method that has the virtues expounded by Weil and that the axiomatic method
is, as I have already indicated, a useful tool in the application and development
of the abstract method. Thus, what characterizes the development of mathe-
matics in the 20th century is the systematic usage of the abstract method and,
as a consequence, the fact that mathematics has become more abstract in the
foregoing precise sense. As Weil sees so clearly, the epistemological benefits of
the abstract method are immense. First, many different results can now be
proved in a uniform manner and from a common core. There is, to use a con-
temporary language, a form of “compression” of the mathematical information.
One and the same proof now applies to significantly different mathematical do-
mains and the proof exhibits the bare essentials involved in the result. This
was also mentioned explicitly by Banach in the introduction of his book on
functional analysis.
The aim of the present work is to establish certain theorems valid in
different functional domains, which I specify in what follows. Nev-
ertheless, in order not to have to prove them for each particular
domain, I have chosen to take a different route...; I consider sets of
elements about which I postulate certain properties; I deduce from
them certain theorems, and I then prove for each particular func-
tional domain that the postulates adopted are true for it. (Banach,
quoted by Moore [21, 280])
That is a crystal clear exposition of the abstract method and its advantages.
Second, the abstract method is a method of discovery. Again, as such,
the axiomatic method is not traditionally thought in those terms13. Certainly,
philosophers never thought of the axiomatic method as a method of discovery.
In the context of the abstract method, however, it makes perfect sense. Indeed,
given (at least) three domains where there is significant variation, if indeed one
can discover common traits that can be used to prove important features of the
situations, the method can be seen as a method of discovery and, as the quote
by Weil shows, it has been considered as such.
Last, but not least, Weil associates the method with the idea of progress. I
cannot venture into the conception of progress underlying Weil’s claim, apart
from the trivial claim that it is seen in a positive light. I will nonetheless
speculate that progress in this particular context is linked to understanding.
It can certainly be claimed that by identifying features that are abstracted
from significantly different situations that nonetheless allow to prove important
facts of these situations, one is lead to conclude that essential properties and
relations have been brought to the fore and that these essential features, these
new concepts, allow us to understand why these results hold. For now, we have
the bare essentials involved in these significantly different cases. Notice that, as
another benefit of the method, one obtains a form of unity of mathematics, a
13See, however, the recent paper [25].
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unity that is not so much the fact that all mathematical entities can be defined
as sets, but rather as a working unity, as concepts that play important roles
in different domains. Certain concepts arise in domains that are significantly
different, sometimes in unexpected ways. It is of course their abstract character
that makes this even possible.
4.2 Being abstract
Traditionally, the property of being abstract is opposed to the property of being
concrete. Thus, an entity is either abstract or concrete, period. As such, the
distinction is presented as being an ontological distinction. The usual strategy
is to provide a way to characterize what it is to be concrete, e.g. being causally
efficacious or having spatio-temporal coordinates, and then say that something
is abstract if it is not concrete. It is well-known that these criteria all have
shortcomings. No matter how you describe them, it is clear that mathematical
entities are not concrete in the ontological sense. But I would rather oppose
concrete to non-concrete than to abstract. I imagine that it is possible for
something to be not-concrete without being abstract, that is without being the
result of a process of abstraction. Be that as it may, it should be clear by now
that the problem I meant to explore is purely epistemological. It is rather a
question of how to introduce differences within the realm of abstractions.
It is a consequence of my approach that the distinction between levels of
abstraction is relative to a given background. I have not given a absolute char-
acterization of levels of abstraction. In a sense, it is purely “local”. For in-
stance, the concept of topological space is more abstract than the concept of
metric space but it is less abstract than the concept of locale. Thus, although
the distinction is not subjective, it is relative. Someone can say that something
is abstract while somebody else will say that the same piece of mathematics is
not that abstract and it won’t constitute a contradiction. In these cases, one
has to unearth the underlying context, the various domains of variation that
are involved, the relationships between the concepts, if there is any, and the
canonical connections between them, if there is any. It should also be obvious
that there are concepts that are simply incomparable with respect to their level
of abstraction. I believe that this is as it should be.
4.3 Going up the ladder of abstraction
I claim that mathematics in the 21st century is, as a matter of fact, becoming
more abstract and it is a inevitable result of the application of the abstract
method in various contexts.
Sometimes, mathematicians do not even see that they are introducing a
domain of variation. This phenomenon happened at least twice in the 20th
century and they turn out to be conceptually closely related: category theory
and homotopy theory. I will ignore homotopy theory in this paper, although
it certainly deserves a whole book. (See, however, [].) When they were first
introduced by Eilenberg and Mac Lane, categories were not even considered as
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being genuine mathematical entities. The were merely conceived as a convenient
tool. The language of category theory was thought to be merely useful in that
it brought a certain order in fields that were at that time rather messy, e.g.
algebraic topology and the emerging homological algebra. But the introduction
of a language introduces with it the possibility of expressing in a new way
properties, expressing new properties and detect invariant patterns that were
hidden before or simply inexistent. If, moreover, that language has the resources
to express in a new fashion criteria of identity, as is the case of category theory,
then everything is in place for the process of abstraction to start and this is
precisely what happened with category theory. First, categories include in an
intrinsic fashion a criterion of identity for the objects of a given category, namely
the notion of isomorphism for that category. It naturally comes with the notion
and the context. Once you have identified a category, you have a notion of
isomorphism, a criterion of identity, for its objects. However, as I have already
mentioned, the proper criterion of identity for categories themselves is not the
notion of isomorphism of categories. It is the notion of equivalence of categories.
It is easy to convince oneself that by adopting the latter criterion we are going
up the ladder of abstraction. And it does not stop there. In fact, there is a
whole hierarchy of levels, called higher-dimensional categories, that each new
level being more abstract than the preceding. Presenting the theory of weak
n-categories would require too much space and would lead us into unnecessary
technical complexities for our purposes. Suffice it to say that our framework
is coherent with the claim that contemporary mathematics is becoming more
abstract. The foregoing framework allows us to say what it could mean.
4.4 Abstracting as a way of simplifying
The abstract method constituted a clear cognitive gain. As I have indicated,
going in the direction of abstraction is a way of unifying different mathematical
domains. The introduction of a level of abstraction is seen as a way of clarifying
and distilling what, in some cases, has become a complex domain or, in other
cases, exhibits similarities, parallels indicating the possibility of an underlying
common framework. The previous disjunction is clearly not exclusive. The
new abstract level not only simplifies the situation but it also yields a better
control and understanding of the concepts involved. The axiomatic method is
an essential part of that process. Axiomatization should be seen, in this light,
as a form of design. For instance, in the case of analogies or similarities, axioms
capture either a common structure or common properties again leading to a
better control and understanding of the features at work. The abstract method
is thus used has a seam, a filter in these processes. It brings to the fore the
Archimedean points upon which solutions to given problems work. What was
previously immersed in a mountain of irrelevant details is unearth and shown
to constitute the mechanisms making concepts work together. This is precisely
why we feel justified in speaking of abstraction. As I have said, the process
leads to new mathematics, conceptually systematic and organized according to
clear principles.
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In recent times, the abstract method has even been presented as being in-
evitable. Here is a wonderful quote illustrating this claim:
The first part of the paper, on which everything else depends, may
perhaps look a little frightening because of the abstract language
that it uses throughout. This is unfortunate, but there is no way
out. It is not the purpose of the abstract language to strive for great
generality. The purpose is rather to simplify proofs, and indeed to
make some proofs understandable at all. The reader is invited to run
the following test: take theorem 2.2.1 (this is about the worst case),
translate the complete proof into not using the abstract language,
and then try to communicate it to somebody else. [28, 318]
It is not possible to go into Waldhausen’s remarkable and fundamental paper
here, which provides an abstract and flexible setting for algebraic K-theory. We
have to take his claims as a reliable testimony in the present context. But this
brief paragraph contains important and bold claims that would deserve to be
unpacked properly. Waldhausen insists that his approach is not motivated by
the search of the most general solution. He was aware that his framework was
more general than Quillen’s framework for algebraic K-theory introduced in the
previous decade. Generality is merely a byproduct of the search for the right
context. The fundamental purpose is “to make some proofs understandable at
all”. The latter is achieved by a process of simplification which, in turn, is itself
a byproduct of the abstract method.
Understanding how there can be different levels of abstraction also helps us
to see how there can be different mathematical styles. For instance, using cate-
gories right from the start and trying to solve given mathematical problems by
using categorical concepts and methods and finding a solution up to categorical
equivalence is a more abstract way of doing mathematics than by using sets
with structures and the resulting notion of isomorphism involved. The reader
who knowns even just a little bit about the history of algebraic geometry in the
second half of the 20th century can recognize Grothendieck’s style in the former
and why it was seen as being so outlandish by many. Grothendieck thought
that by going up the ladder, one would see better the overall organization of
the field, would understand better the general topography of the landscape and
that mathematicians would therefore find their way more easily. In his mind,
the path to the proof would be trivial and obvious. Abstraction is seen as a
radical way to simplify mathematics. Of course, this is possible only after one
has understood how to go up the ladder and that it is a ladder. Others finds
these heights dizzying or consider that going that far up is not worth the effort.
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